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Forest tax programs offer reduced property taxes to private forest owners as incentive to 
sustainably manage their forests and to encourage the provision of ecosystem services. 
They also protect forests from conversion to other land uses and ensure the viable supply 
of timber for forest products industries. Despite the benefits that these programs provide, 
they can negatively impact local municipalities by reducing the property tax base, which 
can then cause local governments to increase tax rates for non-preferential properties in 
order to maintain revenue needed to run their services. This shifts the tax burden from 
participating properties to nonparticipating properties. The purpose of this study was to 
simulate and analyze the effects that increases in enrollment in the Commercial Forest 
and Managed Forest Law programs have on township millage rates in the Upper 
Peninsula of Michigan and the northern region of Wisconsin. Tax data were collected 
from the year 2018, and a deterministic model with hypothetical future scenarios was run 
to estimate the changes in the millage rate with 5%, 10%, and 15% increases in program 
enrollment. Such increases in enrollment resulted in the average township needing to 
increase the tax rates on non-enrolled properties by between 0.002% to 64.7%, depending 
on the magnitude of increased enrollment and pre-enrollment forestland values, to 
maintain a constant revenue. In general, the magnitude of the increase was rather 
minimal, but there was a range in sensitivity across townships with some experiencing 
much higher tax rate increases. Rural townships, with a low population and a smaller tax 
base were seen to be most sensitive to changes in program enrollment. Possible policy 
changes to the forest tax programs and the states’ reimbursement policies may need to be 
considered to help mitigate any loss in tax revenue in the township and to lessen its 
sensitivity. However, this study only focuses on one side of the issue. Future research is 
needed to study the economic benefits that are received by the townships from enrollment 






1.1 Overview of Forest Tax Programs 
 
Forest ecosystem services provide many benefits to individuals and societies, 
including the provision of timber and wood fiber, protection of water, protection of 
wildlife habitat, and recreational opportunities (Kilgore et al. 2018b). An estimated 58% 
of forestland in the United States is privately owned, 36% being owned by family forest 
owners (Butler et al. 2016a). However, private forests are threatened by poor 
management, such as high-grading. In some contexts, the decision to not manage forests 
can prove to be harmful as it can perpetuate existing forest health problems rather than 
seeking to improve them.  
Forests are also threatened by development and parcelization should landowners 
feel pressured to sell their land due to the burden of property taxes (Butler et al. 2012, 
Kelly et al. 2016). This is because property taxes are paid on an annual basis regardless of 
whether or not revenue is generated (Butler et al. 2012). Timberland taxed at high 
property tax rates could incentivize overcutting, as landowners seek to generate revenues 
to offset such taxes (Sexton, 2003). Such harvesting practices can be detrimental to the 
overall health and economic value of the forest, as healthy trees with high economic 
value are removed, leaving behind the defective and low-vigor trees, which could lead to 
depletion of natural resources if applied repeatedly (Nyland et al. 2016). To help relieve 
the tax burden on private forest owners governments have developed forest tax programs, 
which serve to provide incentives through preferential tax treatment to qualified forested 
lands. 
Forest tax programs are administered by state and local governments and were 
initially developed to reduce property taxes on private forested property to discourage 
land-use conversion and maintain timber production (Fortney and Arano, 2010). They are 
also used to encourage the provision of ecosystem services, as well as continuing to 
protect forests from conversion to other land uses and to ensure the viable supply of 
timber for forest products industries (Kilgore et al. 2018b). Forest ecosystem services that 
are a common focus across different programs include the production of timber and fiber 
products, protection of soils and wetlands, protection of fish and wildlife habitat, open 
2 
space and scenic resources, protection of water quality, and recreational opportunities 
(Kilgore et al. 2018b). One unexpected benefit of these programs is that they help to 
promote forest carbon sequestration, through the conservation and management of large, 
forested areas, which may help to aid the country in its ability to meet the climate change 
policy obligations. With the current forest tax policies that are in place, it is estimated 
that by 2050, about $8 billion per year in climate change mitigation benefits will be 
provided (Daigneault et al. 2020).  
All fifty states offer a preferential tax program to private landowners (Butler et al. 
2012), and currently 44% of all eligible private forestland, which include 
corporate/industrial forestland, in the United States are enrolled in property tax programs 
(Kilgore et al. 2018b). The programs differ in their goals and qualifications, but the 
underlying goal is to promote the sustainability of private forests (Kilgore et al. 2018a). 
Whether or not a property is qualified for preferential tax treatment differs for each 
program, but in general parcel size and location, type and condition of the forest 
resources, and the ability to produce certain goods and services determine whether or not 
a parcel qualifies for a given forest tax program (Kilgore et al. 2018a).  
There are uncertainties as to the effectiveness of these programs. Kilgore et al. 
(2007) found that while program administrators viewed financial incentive programs as 
having a positive effect on promoting sustainable practices, family forest owners viewed 
technical assistance and information as more important and were not influenced so much 
by the incentive programs. Meier et al. (2019) also found that tax programs may not be 
effective at encouraging landowners to preserve and retain their land as forest, as 
program participants were just as likely as nonparticipants to express intentions to sell 
their land at some point. However, there have also been studies which show forest tax 
programs effectively conserve forests and reduce property taxes. On average, forest tax 
programs reduce forest property taxes by $7.68 per acre across the nation (Kilgore et al. 
2018b). However, Frey et al. (2019) found that landowners who enroll in forest tax 
programs do so out of concern to conserve their forests, and that this concern was more 
influential than to reducing taxes. Forest tax programs have also been shown to be 
effective in preventing development on forested land (Locke and Rissman, 2012). 
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Overall, despite the uncertainties as to their effectiveness, forest tax programs are used as 
a policy incentive tool to encourage the sustainability of forests. Many forest owners are 
interested and desire to know how to manage their forestland sustainably, and these forest 
tax programs help enable them to do so (Kilgore et al. 2007).  
There are five different types of forest tax programs: ad valorem, current use, flat 
rate, exemption, and hybrid programs (Hibbard et al. 2003). Ad valorem programs tax 
forestland according to its fair market value. Current use programs tax the land based on 
its taxable value according to its current use as forestland. Flat rate programs tax the 
property at a fixed rate per acre. Exemption programs completely exempt forestland from 
property taxes. Hybrid programs combine the current use and ad valorem methodology to 
determine the property tax (Hibbard et al. 2003). 
 
1.2 Public Polices for Private Forests 
 
Forest policies are designed to encourage preservation and sustainable management 
of forestlands so that society can continue to receive the benefits that private forests 
provide. Forest policies also help to address externalities, positive and negative, and 
market failures that arise with the management of private forests (Cubbage et al. 2007). 
An externality occurs when the actions of an individual or group either bring about harm 
(a negative externality) or provide benefits (a positive externality) to individuals or a 
society, but yet do not bear the cost nor are compensated for their actions (Gruber, 2019). 
For instance, the management of a nearby forest may negatively impact certain groups of 
individuals by reducing aesthetic value, however those individuals may not be 
compensated for their loss. Poor forestry practices may also result in erosion and 
pollution into a nearby stream, which impact fish populations and would thus negatively 
affect fishers. However, the forest owner may not necessarily bear the cost of the loss 
experienced by the fishers, thus resulting in a negative externality. Private forest 
landowners also may not be compensated for the positive externalities that their forests 
provide to the public, such as providing wildlife habitat, protecting water quality, and 
providing aesthetic beauty.  
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Forest policies are meant to address these issues by providing regulations or 
incentives to ensure the sustainable management of forests, to reduce erosion and 
pollution, and to help compensate the landowners, such as by reducing taxes, for the 
benefits that their forests provide to the general public (Cubbage et al. 2007). Figure 1, 
taken from Aguilar et al. (2019), illustrates how forest policies help to account for the 
loss in social efficiency caused by externalities.  
Externalities can shift the demand or supply curve, thereby causing the two curves 
to intersect at a different point, away from the market equilibrium. Forest policies help to 
correct for this by inducing a cost or an incentive to shift the supply curve so as to return 
to the point of equilibrium and social efficiency. For instance, the demand curve may 
shift upwards from curve D to D’ as forest value increases, but this causes a decrease in 
social efficiency as the supply curve, or the cost to the forest owners, remains the same. 
Forest tax programs help to restore social efficiency by offering a tax incentive to the 
forest owners, thereby reducing the cost of forests which causes the supply curve to shift 
downwards from curve S to S’ (Fig. 1).   
There are three main categories of policy instruments that can be used to encourage 
the participation of private forest landowners: financial, regulative, and informational 
(Serbruyns and Luyssaert, 2006). Financial policy tools include payments for certain 
management activities, such as planting trees or improving timber stands, and incentives 
to encourage conservation, such as tax reductions (Cubbage et al. 2009). Regulatory 
policy tools are used to regulate the management strategies of forests to ensure 
sustainable management, and are used to prevent undesirable or destructive outcomes, 
such as pollution, excess timber harvests, and resource exhaustion. They are also used to 
prevent negative externalities and market failures, as well as to ensure forest regeneration 
and to promote positive externalities, (Cubbage et al. 2009). Informational policy tools 
deals with the education of both the public and the professionals. These tools can be used 
to educate the public on how to properly manage and preserve their natural resources, and 
to educate and improve the technical skills of forestry and logging professionals 
(Cubbage et al. 2007). Informational tools may also be used to inform private forest 
owners about different incentive programs that they can enroll their properties in for the 
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purpose of managing and conserving their forests. Compared to the other policy tools, 
informational tools may be the most important as their implementation and success 
affects the success of financial and regulative tools. In a study done in Belgium, the more 
highly educated landowners in matters of forest management were more likely to accept 
policy instruments than owners who had a poor education and understanding (Serbruyns 
and Luyssaert, 2006). Figure 2 illustrates how these policy tools help to exchange forest 
values between the private landowners and society, as well as between the current and the 











Figure 1. Process of value co-creation within a neo-classical supply-and-demand partial market 
equilibrium framework. A change in welfare (wellbeing) among groups can be positive (shaded 
area) as the marginal value (costs or benefits) to each group shift. Solid lines denote value 
relationships prior to changes (S, D), and dotted lines denote posterior value relationships (S’, 
D’). Public policy can be instrumental to such changes. (Aguilar et al. 2019) 
Reprinted/adapted by permission from Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH: 
Springer Nature, Total economic value, ecosystem services and the role of public policy 
instruments in the creation and destruction of forest values by F.X. Aguilar, M.C. Kelly, and B. 
Danley. In: Services in Family Forestry by T. Hujala, A. Toppinen,, and B. Butler.  
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Figure 2.  Forest value exchange model to account for temporal changes of value in no-use 
exchanged between current and future beneficiaries. (Aguilar et al. 2019) 
Reprinted/adapted by permission from Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH: 
Springer Nature, Total economic value, ecosystem services and the role of public policy 
instruments in the creation and destruction of forest values by F.X. Aguilar, M.C. Kelly, and B. 
Danley. In: Services in Family Forestry by T. Hujala, A. Toppinen,, and B. Butler.  
[COPYRIGHT] (2019).  
 
1.3 Overview of Property Taxes 
 
Property taxes are a significant source of revenue for local governments, 
accounting for three-quarters of the total tax revenue (Ganz, 2014). Local governments 
depend upon tax revenue to fund public services, including education, transportation, 
emergency response, parks and recreation, and libraries (Seabury, 2020). The extent to 
which a local government relies upon property tax revenue depends on three different 
factors: the total budget of the municipality, the amount of revenue received from federal 
and state governments, and the amount of revenue that is raised from other tax sources 
(Brighton, 1993).  
Property tax is an ad valorem tax, meaning that it is based on an assessed value 























Current generations Future generations 
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price that the property would sell for in an open market. For instance, in Michigan the 
property is assessed at 50% of the market value (Sexton, 2003). There are two different 
types of property that may be included in the tax base: real and personal property. Real 
property is defined as land and anything that is permanently attached to it. Personal 
property is the property that is not part of or permanently attached to real property 
(Sexton, 2003). Some states include only real property in their tax base, and others offer 
exemptions and differential treatments for certain types of properties (Sexton, 2003). 
Some states have classification systems, where different types of property may be taxed 
at a different rate or assessed differently, and some properties may be all together exempt 
from property taxes, such as properties owned by schools (Sexton, 2003).  
The property tax that a landowner will pay is determined from the taxable value of 
the property and the millage rate. Some local governments may use the assessed value as 
the taxable value, but most often the taxable value is lower than the assessed value. This 
is because the value includes any exemptions that the property may be qualified for, and 
oftentimes it is capped so as not to exceed a certain amount (Richard, n.d.). The taxable 
value is then multiplied by the millage rate to determine the tax levy, which is the actual 
amount the landowner will pay. The millage, or mill, rate is the amount of tax payable 
per dollar of the assessed (or taxable) value. The mill is a figure that represents 1/10th of a 
cent. Thus, for $1,000 of taxable property value the mill rate would equal $1 (Kagan, 
2020). The millage rate is determined by the group (county, township, school, etc.) that is 
charging the tax, and each legal entity may set a different millage rate (Kagan, 2020).  
Property taxes are a main source of revenue for local governments, and yet there 
are many properties, particularly state and federal lands, that are exempt from paying 
property taxes. To help offset these losses in property tax revenue, the federal and state 
governments make a payment in lieu of taxes (PILT) to the local governments. The 
payment is based on the acreage of land owned by the state and federal governments, and 
for federal land it is also determined by the population and revenue-sharing payments 
received from the state within the county (U.S. Department of Interior, n.d.). Revenue-
sharing is another additional source of revenue to local governments and is a program 
where the state shares revenue with the local governments. For example, in Michigan the 
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state takes 4% of the state’s sale tax revenue, and then distributes 15% of that portion of 
the revenue to all cities, villages, and townships (Michigan Department of Treasury, n.d.).  
 
1.4 Tax Incidence 
 
Tax incidence refers to who bears the true burden of the tax (Gruber, 2019). 
Regarding the tax of real property, it is considered that the landowner bears the entire 
burden of the tax because land is inelastically supplied (Sexton, 2014). To be inelastic 
means that the good has few or no substitutes. Since the consumer cannot substitute for 
another good there is little change in quantity demanded with changes in price because 
the consumer cannot leave the market, causing them to bear the full tax burden (Gruber, 
2019).  
A redistribution of the tax burden can occur when the tax base is reduced by the 
removal of certain properties, as the tax dollars that would have been due from those 
properties must now come from other properties that are still part of the tax base 
(Chamberlin, 1993). Such a tax shift may be caused by tax incentive programs that seek 
to give tax relief to certain types of properties. Such programs include classification 
systems, differential assessment programs, forest tax programs, and conservation 
easements (Chamberlin, 1993; King and Anderson, 2004; Sexton, 2014). With a 
reduction in the tax base, local governments may experience a loss in tax revenue. This 
loss may cause the local governments to increase the tax rates (mill rates) for the non-
preferential properties in order to maintain the necessary revenue needed to run their 
services (Brighton, 1993; King and Anderson, 2004; Sexton, 2014). Some states 
reimburse local governments to help compensate for this loss in tax revenue. In this 
situation the tax incidence may change so that the burden of the tax shift may now be 
partially borne by the state, and thereby all taxpayers throughout the state and not fully by 
the taxpayers within the local municipality. The amount of revenue that is received from 
federal or state governments helps determine the extent of the tax burden that is borne by 
the property owners. For example, the State of Vermont fully reimburses the towns for 
the loss in property taxes due to enrollment in their forest tax programs, thus the state 
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bears the full burden as the tax is now shifted to the state’s general fund rather than to the 
landowners of the non-participating properties (Brighton, 1993). In Maine the state only 
reimburses the municipality 90% of its tax losses from forest tax programs, thus causing 
the remaining 10% of the tax burden to be borne by the municipal taxpayers (Brighton, 
1993). Michigan and Wisconsin reimburse the local municipalities at a fixed rate. For 
enrollment in the Commercial Forest program, Michigan reimburses at the same tax rate 
that is levied on the enrolled properties, which is currently $1.30 per acre (Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 2018), and Wisconsin reimburses for 
enrollment in the Managed Forest Law program at $0.20 per acre (Managed Forest Law, 
2021).  
The tax shift may seem unfair, but it is important to note that such an event is not 
uncommon. Whenever governments offer deductions for different types of taxes a tax 
shift will occur from the class of taxpayers that are receiving the benefits to the taxpayers 
who are not receiving the benefits (Chamberlin, 1993). Also, while these tax shifts may 
be deemed a cost to other property owners, they also help protect private forests and 
maintain a flow of benefits to local communities, including timber production, public 
access, and the conservation of forest lands (Chamberlin, 1993).  
More research is needed to determine how significantly forest tax programs impact 
local communities in terms of shifting the tax burden, and to discover if the benefits 
provided by private forests enrolled in such tax program (e.g. provision of ecosystem 
services, timber, and recreational opportunities) outweigh the potential costs of these 
programs in terms of increased taxes on non-enrolled properties. If the programs are 
indeed causing a reduction in the local government tax revenue through the reduction in 
the tax base, then it may be that the policy of these programs should be revisited so as to 
continue to provide the benefits that they offer without causing significant harm to the 
municipalities. The following literature review provides a background on family forest 
owner participation in forest tax programs, as well as a review of previous studies which 
have looked at the impacts of enrollment in these preferential tax programs on the local 
municipality’s property taxes, specifically for current use-value assessment programs on 
agricultural land, conservation easements, and lastly on forest tax programs.   
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1.5 Literature Review 
 
1.5.1 Landowner Participation in Tax Programs 
 
Nationwide, about 44% of all eligible private forestland, which includes land 
owned by individuals, families, corporate organizations, Native American tribes, 
nongovernmental conservation organizations, and other private entities, is enrolled in a 
special property tax program (Kilgore et al. 2018b). While nearly half of all private 
forestland is enrolled, participation of family forest owners accounts for a smaller 
portion. Only about 17% of family forest ownerships, which accounts for 26% of family 
forest land, is enrolled nationwide (Butler et al. 2020). One possible reason for low 
participation of these family forest owners is a lack of awareness about such programs as 
well as landowner frustrations with the administration and requirements of the programs 
(Butler et al. 2012). The programs are seen as difficult to access, unpredictable in regard 
to the funding and requirements, and rigid in their management guidelines, sometimes 
compelling landowners to manage their land in a way that might not align with their 
objectives (Kilgore et al. 2007; Butler et al. 2012). However, despite these complaints the 
landowners who do participate have reported overall satisfaction with the programs, and 
the programs are generally successful in promoting sustainable management practices 
(Butler et al. 2012; Kilgore et al. 2007).  
Different studies have looked at the differences between landowners who do 
participate in forest tax programs and those who do not to determine the factors that make 
a landowner more likely to participate in such programs. In general, landowners that 
participate in property tax programs tend to have a higher acreage of land and higher 
levels of education and income compared to those who do not participate (Frey et al. 
2019; Meier et al. 2019). Participants are also more likely to own their land for timber 
and aesthetic reasons, whereas non-participants are more likely to own their land for 
hunting purposes (Meier et al. 2019). One interesting aspect is that while these programs 
are designed to offer reduced property taxes to act as an incentive for landowners to 
enroll, taxes do not seem to be a major factor affecting program enrollment of 
landowners. Many private forest owners are indeed concerned about property taxes, and 
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studies have shown that tax uncertainty negatively affects the management decisions of 
landowners (Butler et al. 2012; Greene et al. 2014), but landowners are more likely to 
enroll out of concern to protect and conserve forested land, rather than to just simply save 
money (Frey et al. 2019).  
 
1.5.2 Current use-value assessment programs 
 
The current use-value assessment program taxes qualifying properties according 
to the property’s current use rather than by its highest and best use. Coogan et al. (2014) 
studied the current use-value assessment program for agricultural lands in Wayne 
County, Ohio. They found that enrollment in the program reduced the taxable property 
tax base by 69.7%, which would have consequently resulted in the property tax revenues 
being reduced by 69.8% if the tax rate was not increased. The authors of that study found 
that a larger portion of the property tax burden fell on residential and commercial 
property owners, resulting in a shift in the tax burden. A tax shift was also observed by 
Dunford and Marousek (1981) who conducted a study on the effects of the use-value 
assessment program for farmland in Spokane County, Washington. They found that 
enrollment in the program caused an increase in taxes for the nonparticipating properties, 
but interestingly the rate of increase was not uniform across the different areas of study, 
ranging from a tax increase of 1.1% to 21.9%. They found that the size of the remaining 
tax base greatly impacted how much of a tax increase those nonparticipating properties 
were likely to receive. Areas which had a large portion of land enrolled in the use-value 
assessment program had a smaller tax base, which led to those properties experiencing 
the largest tax increases. The areas with a smaller portion of land enrolled in the program 
had larger tax base, which led to those areas experiencing much smaller tax increases.  
 
1.5.3 Conservation easements 
 
Another type of tax incentive program for private landowners are conservation 
easements. Conservation easements are used to preserve both agricultural and forest land. 
With a conservation easement, landowners receive a tax reduction in exchange for 
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transferring their development rights to another entity, usually a nonprofit organization 
(King and Anderson, 2004). While conservation easements have also been found to cause 
shifts in the tax burden, leading to increases in taxes on nonparticipating properties, 
Schuster et al. (2018) believes that this mechanism of the tax shift is an efficient means 
for governments to meet conservation targets without having to reduce tax revenues. 
Based on their study, conservation targets of increasing protected lands by 17% or 30% 
in Canada could be feasibly met. The scenario showing a 9% to 17% increase in area 
protection to meet Convention on Biological Diversity targets with the lowest enrollment 
uptake of 25% resulted in nonparticipating property tax rates increasing by 0.51%. More 
proactive targets to conserve a higher percentage of the landscape, such as increasing 
protected lands by 30%, require larger increases in tax rates, but appears feasible 
(Schuster et al. 2018). 
While these programs tend to cause tax increases on nonparticipating properties in 
the short-term, a study by King and Anderson (2004) found that in the long-term, these 
programs may cause tax rates to decrease due to an increase in property value of 
properties surrounding the protected areas. King and Anderson (2004) analyzed the 
effects that conservation easements have on the tax rates for towns in Vermont over the 
span of ten years. While tax rates did increase on non-participating properties within the 
first few years, the rates were seen to diminish afterwards. This was due to the 
surrounding properties around the conserved areas experiencing an increase in their 
appraisal value. While this led to higher tax bills for those surrounding properties, it 
allowed for the towns to reduce the tax rate overall as the tax levy had increased. This 
enabled residents whose lands were relatively far away from the easements to receive 
lower tax bills (King and Anderson, 2004). Even though a shift was still seen to occur on 
non-enrolled properties, it was shift in the assessed value rather than in the tax rate.   
 
1.5.4 Forest tax programs 
 
Brighton (1993) conducted a study on the current use-value assessment programs 
for forestland in the four northern forest states of Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire and 
New York. The shifting of the tax burden also occurred in areas with land enrolled in the 
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program, but payments coming from the state were found to be a large factor in 
determining the weight of the shift. In all four of these states the state reimburses the 
local municipalities for any losses in their tax revenues from the current use-value 
assessment programs, but the percentage of the loss that is reimbursed affects the weight 
of the tax burden borne by the non-enrolled properties. In the State of Vermont, the towns 
are fully reimbursed for their tax revenue losses. This causes the tax burden to be shifted 
to the state’s general fund rather than to the taxpayers of the nonparticipating properties 
in that local municipality, which consequently results in a shift from the property tax to 
other taxes, like the income tax. The states of Maine, New Hampshire, and New York 
only partially reimburse towns for the revenue losses, which means that the tax burden is 
partially shifted onto the state, and therefore onto taxpayers across the entire state and not 
just within the particular municipality, and partially onto the taxpayers within the 
municipality, depending on how much of the full amount the municipalities receive. 
Brighton (1993) also found that the remaining tax base largely determines how high of a 
tax rate increase the municipalities experience. Rural towns with a smaller tax base 
experience a larger increase in their tax bill compared to towns with larger tax bases. It is 
also important to note that while in the short term these programs can cause a tax shift 
and a cost onto society, in the long term they provide benefits to society as they 
encourage the preservation of forestland and discourage development (Brighton, 1993).  
A study by Rickenbach and Saunders (2009) focused on the tax implications of a 
forest tax programs on townships in Wisconsin and found that increases in program 
enrollment resulted in the average township experiencing an increased tax rate. However, 
similar to the results found by Dunford and Marousek (1981), they noticed that the 
relationship varied across townships. While most of the townships experienced only 
slight changes to their tax rates, some experienced much larger increases or even 
decreases in their tax rates with increases in program enrollment. This suggests that the 
townships have different sensitivity levels, with some being more sensitive than others to 
changes in program enrollment. One possible reason for this difference is the portion of 
land in a township that is enrolled in other tax incentive programs. Rickenbach and 
Saunders (2009) noted that the more highly sensitive townships had a greater portion of 
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land enrolled in the Agricultural Forest classification, which is a program that also 
reduces property taxes for qualifying properties. In situations like this, a township’s 
property tax base is already lowered because of land enrolled in competing programs, 
which would make the township more sensitive with even further reductions in the tax 
base from increasing enrollment in the forest tax program. Rickenbach and Saunders 
(2009) also found that a township’s tax base was related to its sensitivity, as the more 
highly sensitive townships had a smaller tax base. Additional sources of revenue from the 
State also affected the township’s sensitivity to changes in the forest tax program 
enrollment, as the more highly sensitive townships received the lower amounts of shared 
revenue payments, and the townships with typical enrollment and sensitivity received the 
higher amounts of shared revenue payments. Historically in Wisconsin, shared revenue 
payments adequately covered any losses experienced in tax revenues, but at the time 
when the study was conducted those payments had been frozen at 2003 levels, which 
meant that the payments were no longer being adjusted for any changes in land use 
classifications in the townships. Seeing as how the more highly sensitive townships 
received the lowest amount of shared revenue payments, it shows that indeed these 
payments are not being adjusted for changes in land use. This demonstrates the 
importance that such revenues have in helping to mitigate any losses in a township’s tax 
revenue, due to reductions in the tax base from property tax incentive programs. 
Previous literature shows that enrollment in preferential tax programs can indeed 
cause a reduction in the local municipality’s property tax base, and may consequently 
cause property taxes to increase for the non-enrolled properties. However, there have 
been relatively few studies that have looked at how significantly enrollment in these 
programs impacts the millage rates issued on non-participating properties, and there have 
been no studies that have looked at the tax implications of forest tax programs in 
Michigan. My study will contribute to this topic of research by studying how enrollment 
in the Commercial Forest program in Michigan (https://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-
350-79136_79237_80945_83262---,00.html) and the Managed Forest Law program in 
Wisconsin (https://dnr.wisconsin.gov/topic/forestlandowners/mfl) impacts the property 
tax rates of rural townships, and how significantly they shift the tax burden onto all 
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classes of non-participating properties. My research will shed more light on the potential 
costs of forest tax programs to non-enrolled property owners, which is important for 
economic and social sustainability. It will also further explore possible variables that 
could be affecting the townships’ sensitivity levels to changes in the property tax rates 
with increasing enrollment in these programs.  
 
1.6 Study Area 
 
The two study areas are Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and northern Wisconsin. 
These areas were chosen as they are rural and heavily forested, and include a mix of 
ownership types including private, state, and federal lands (Fig. 3).  
 
1.6.1 Upper Peninsula of Michigan 
 
Michigan’s forests have been shaped and influenced over time by both natural and 
human factors. Glaciation during the last ice age created a landscape with a wide 
variability in topography and soil types, which formed the foundation for the different 
forest types (Hamel et al. 2013). Prior to European settlement, the Upper Peninsula was 
dominated by late successional lowland and upland conifer forest types. Other common 
forest types included hemlock/sugar maple, sugar maple/yellow birch/fir, and 
beech/sugar maple (Hamel et al. 2013; Matson et al. 2013). In the mid-late 1800s the 
forests of Michigan were heavily logged, which lead to a period of severe wildfires 
(Hamel et al. 2013). It was after this time, in the early 1900s, when the public began to 
realize the importance of conserving Michigan’s natural resources (Matson et al. 2013). 
By the 1990s forestry companies had begun practicing sustainable forestry practices 
(Hamel et al. 2013), which have continued to be the primary focus of forest management 
today. Currently the dominate forest types are now early successional species, such as 
aspen, and other deciduous species (Hamel et al. 2013; Matson et al. 2013). The dominate 
forest type in Michigan is maple/beech/birch, with 44% of it located in the western region 
of the Upper Peninsula. For softwoods species, spruce/fir is the most dominant forest 
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type group in Michigan, with 47% of it being found in the eastern region of the Upper 
Peninsula (Pugh, 2018). 
The State of Michigan has over 20 million acres of forest land, of which the 
Upper Peninsula contains 45% (Pugh, 2018). Statewide, about 65% of Michigan’s forests 
are privately owned, 47.3% owned by family forest owners, 14.6% owned by private 
corporations, and 3.6% owned by other private entities (Pugh, 2018). The remaining 38% 
of forested land is publicly owned, 20.8% owned by the State of Michigan, 13.6% owned 
by the USDA Forest Service, 1.1% owned by the National Park Service, and 2.6% owned 
by other public groups (Pugh, 2018). Timberland, which is forested land that grows 
suitable trees or is managed for timber, accounts for 95% of the forested land (Pugh, 
2018).  
Michigan’s forests play a significant role in the state’s economy. The forest 
products industries contribute $20.3 billion in output, $5.2 billion in labor, and provides 
96,623 jobs, taking into account all the direct, indirect, and induced effects of the 
industries (Leefers, 2016). In the Upper Peninsula where most of the land area is forested, 
these forest products industries act as an even greater contributor to Michigan’s economy. 
Over a third of the manufacturing jobs in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula are in the forest 
products industries, the most significant industries being the primary paper and 
paperboard production industry, logging, and the primary solid wood products and wood-
based power industry (Leefers, 2016). Overall the forest products industries contribute 
$1.8 billion in output, $3.1 million in labor, and 4,966 jobs in the Upper Peninsula’s 
western region, and $3.8 million in output, $61.9 million in labor, and 1,073 jobs in the 
eastern region (Leefers, 2016). Michigan’s forests also serve as a major attraction for 
tourists, and thus affects other industries related to tourism.  
There are 15 counties and 149 townships in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. 
According to the regions specified by Michigan’s Department of Natural Resources, the 
western region contains 10 of the counties and 102 townships. The eastern region 
contains the remaining 5 counties and 47 townships (Leefers, 2016). The population in 
the western region is 172,828, and the eastern region having a population of 132,417. 
Combined, the population of the Upper Peninsula makes up only 3% of the total 
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population of the State of Michigan (9,995,915) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018b). The Upper 
Peninsula is rural with a lower average household income compared to the State of 
Michigan overall. The mean income in the Upper Peninsula is $57,000, while the mean 
income for Michigan is $77,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018a). Michigan itself also only 
contains 3% of the nation’s population, the entire United States having a population of 
327,167,439 and a mean income of $87,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). 
 
1.6.2 Northern Wisconsin 
 
Glacial activity from the last glaciation period shaped and formed the landscape 
of Wisconsin to its present state, creating thousands of kettle lakes and allowing for a 
complex array of different habitat types. In the 1800s, during the European settlement, 
forestland made up 63-86% of the state. The northern region was dominated by pine, 
spruce, tamarack, sugar maple, hemlock, and yellow birch. The central and northwestern 
region of Wisconsin consists of sandier soil, making pine forests and barrens more 
abundant. The southern region was dominated by oak-hickory and maple-basswood 
forest types. Oak savannahs and prairies were prevalent in parts of the southern and 
western regions (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2018).  
The great “cutover” began in the late 1800s and lasted into the early 1900s in 
which the whole state saw a great deal of its timber harvested. This was followed by 
severe and devasting fires, due to the large amounts of slash left behind from the timber 
harvests. By the 1930s most of the valuable timber in the northern region had been 
removed or lost by fires. This allowed for early successional species, such as aspen and 
birch, to become more prevalent (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2018). 
Currently Wisconsin has over 16.4 million acres of timberland, with most of the 
forests being located in the northern regions (Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, 2020a). The dominant forest types in northern Wisconsin are aspen/birch, 
maple/basswood, spruce/fir, pine, and oak/pine forest groups, and the dominate forest 
type in southern Wisconsin is the oak/hickory group (Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, 2020a). Most of the forested land in Wisconsin is privately owned, with 57% 
owned by individual family landowners and 13% being owned by other private owners. 
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The remaining 30% is public land, with 14% owned by counties and municipalities, 9% 
by the federal government, and 7% by the state (Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, 2018). The number of private forest owners continues to increase, the number 
of non-industrial private forest owners increasing by 12.4% from 2006-2013. This 
increase in ownership has also consequently led to an increase in parcelization as more 
land parcels are needing to be divided, with an average increase of 6,400 new parcels per 
year (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2018).   
The forest products industry is an important contributor to Wisconsin’s economy. 
About 65,000 people are directly employed by the forest products industry, and more 
than 110,000 people are indirectly employed. Companies produce about 25 billion dollars 
of forest products every year (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2018). Of all 
the forest products industries, the paper industry is the most significant contributor to the 
economy, holding nearly half of the jobs in the forest products industry (Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources, 2020b). Besides this direct contribution to the 
economy, the forests of Wisconsin also offer many recreational opportunities, which help 
contribute to industries related to tourism.  
The northern highland region of Wisconsin consists of 24 counties, but this study 
will only focus on 10 of those counties: Ashland, Florence, Forest, Iron, Langlade, 
Lincoln, Marinette, Oneida, Price, and Sawyer counties. Within these 10 counties there 
are 149 townships. The population of these counties is about 187,563, and the average 
household income is $61,000. These northern counties hold 3% of the state’s population, 
with the State of Wisconsin having a population of 5,183,658 with an average income of 




Figure 3: Map of study areas with forest ownership types 
 
 
1.7 Forest Tax Programs in Study 
 
1.7.1 Commercial Forest Program 
 
Michigan’s Commercial Forest (CF) program is a property tax incentive program 
designed to encourage private forest landowners to conserve large tracts of forested land 
while managing for long-term timber production. It is a voluntary program which is open 
to all private forest landowners, including family forest owners and commercial forest 
owners, and is administered by Michigan’s Department of Natural Resources. 
Participating landowners pay reduced property taxes at a fixed tax rate rather than paying 
the ad valorem general property tax. From 2017-2021 the tax rate is fixed at a $1.30 per 
acre, which is set to increase by 5 cents every 5 years. Eligible properties must be at least 
40 acres and be capable of producing a commercial stand of timber and tree species with 
economic value. Enrolled landowners are required to actively manage their forest 
according to a qualified management plan. Enrolled land can only be used for producing 
and harvesting timber. It cannot be used for agriculture, grazing, mineral extraction, or 
development. It is also required that enrolled land be open to the public for hunting, 
trapping, and fishing. Once enrolled, properties are classified as Commercial Forest into 
perpetuity, as long as they continue to meet the requirements. Participating landowners 
can withdraw their property from the program, but they are subject to a withdrawal 
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penalty whose amount depends on several factors, including how many years the 
landowner was in the program and how many acres they are withdrawing (Michigan 
Department of Natural Resources, 2018). If the enrolled property undergoes a transfer in 
ownership, its status as Commercial Forest land is not affected. The new owner may 
either choose to continue or withdraw from the program. If they withdraw, they are 
responsible for the withdrawal fee. This program is not contractual for the landowners. 
The legislature may change the rules at any given time, and the landowners are expected 
to just absorb the changes. Currently over 2.2 million acres of forested land in the Upper 
Peninsula is enrolled in the Commercial Forest program (Michigan Department of 
Natural Resources, 2020). 
 
1.7.2 Managed Forest Law 
 
Wisconsin’s Managed Forest Law (MFL) is available to all private forest owners, 
including family forest owners and commercial forest owners, and is administered by the 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. It is a tax incentive program designed to 
encourage private landowners to manage their forests sustainably. Eligible parcels must 
be at least 20 acres, have at least 80% forest coverage, and be capable of growing timber 
for wood products. It is required that participating landowners have management plans 
and conduct timber harvests. The landowners must commit to a 25- or 50-year 
sustainable forest management plan. The landowner can opt to open their land to the 
public, or to keep it closed. Open land may be used by the public for recreational 
activities, including hunting, fishing, and hiking. Participating landowners pay an acreage 
share tax rather than the ad valorem property tax. For open land the acreage share tax rate 
is based on 5% of the average statewide tax on productive forest land ($40.80 per acre), 
which amounts to $2.04 per acre. For closed land the landowners pay the acreage share 
tax rate plus an additional closed acreage fee which is based on 20% of the average 
statewide tax, which amounts to a tax rate of $10.20 for closed land. These tax rates are 
applicable for 2018-2022 and are set to adjust every 5 years to reflect the changing 
property tax rates. These rates apply for properties that are enrolled in the MFL program 
after 2005. Lands that were enrolled before 2005, from 1987-2004, pay much lower tax 
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rates: $0.74 for open land and $1.75 for closed land. Enrolled properties can be 
withdrawn from the program, but they are subject to a withdrawal tax plus a withdrawal 
fee of $300 (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2017). Enrolled properties that 
undergo a transfer in ownership are still enrolled in the MFL program if the new owner 
agrees to conform to the program rules. If they choose to withdraw from the program, 
they are responsible for the withdrawal fees. This program is contractual, and once the 
property is in the program the state cannot change the rules. Currently over 3.4 million 
acres of forested land in Wisconsin is enrolled in the Managed Forest Law program 
(Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2020c).  
 
 
Table 1: Commercial Forest vs Managed Forest Law 
 Commercial Forest Managed Forest Law 
State Michigan Wisconsin 
Min. Acreage Requirement 40 20 
Open to Public Yes Optional 
Management Plan Required Required 
Withdrawal penalty Yes Yes 
Tax rate $1.30/acre Open land: $2.04/acre 




1.8 Research Questions 
 
In view of the findings of the previous literature regarding property enrollment in 
preferential tax programs and their effects on the township’s property tax base and 
millage rates, this research addresses the following questions with regards to the 
Commercial Forest (CF) program in Michigan and the Managed Forest Law (MFL) 
program in Wisconsin:  
 
1. How does increased enrollment in CF and MFL affect tax rates on all classes of 
non-enrolled properties included in the townships tax base? 
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2. Are some townships more sensitive to changes in their millage rate with changes 
in property enrollment than others, and if so why? 
3. To what degree do the PILT and other government reimbursement payments help 
to mitigate the shift to non-enrolled properties?  
4. For WI, is the sensitivity to changes in the millage rate different depending on 
whether increasing MFL enrollment occurs in the “open” or “closed” category?  
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2 Methods 
2.1 Data Collection 
 
Data were collected only for the Commercial Forest program in Michigan and the 
Managed Forest Law program in Wisconsin. The Qualified Forest program in Michigan 
was not included in the study as the data related to that program are available only at the 
county level, and this study investigated effects at the township level. Also, unlike the CF 
program which simply applies a fixed rate to all properties, the tax fee that is due on 
Qualified Forest properties depends on that property’s taxable value, as one of the main 
tax benefits is a local school operation tax exemption of up to 18 mills. However, 
individual parcel data is not readily available for the State of Michigan. Due to these 
complications, township level enrollment and tax revenue data for the Qualified Forest 
program was not considered in this study.  
Census data regarding township demographics and housing characteristics were 
collected from the United States Census Bureau. Data were collected at the township 
level for the year 2018, and included population, median household income, median 
house value, the proportion of housing units that were owner-occupied, renter-occupied, 
and vacant, and the year that the house owner moved into unit, which was measured 
according to the number of owner-occupied housing units that were moved into. The 
variable used shows the proportion of owner-occupied housing units that were moved 
into before and after 2010. The township’s population was divided by the township’s 
total area to get the population density per square mile. The population data does not 
include seasonal or absentee owners. These data were collected to get an estimate of the 
number of non-enrolled properties and how valuable they are, which gives an indication 
of the size of the township’s available property tax base.  
Property tax data were collected from year 2018 at the township level from various 
online sources (See Table 2). This particular year was chosen as it was the most recent 
tax year with available data at the time when this study was initiated. The total acres 
enrolled in the forest tax programs and the tax rates levied on those enrolled properties 
were extracted from the respective States’ Department of Natural Resources websites 
(https://www.michigan.gov/dnr; https://dnr.wisconsin.gov/). The total taxable value of 
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real property in each of the Michigan townships was extracted from the State’s 
Department of Treasury (https://www.michigan.gov/treasury). For Wisconsin, the 
township’s total assessed value for the combined property classes of 5 (undeveloped), 5m 
(agricultural forest), 6 (forest), and 7 (other) was extracted from the State’s Department 
of Revenue (https://www.revenue.wi.gov/pages/home.aspx). The total assessed value was 
used rather than the taxable value (the DOR Base Value) as the assessed values are used 
to determine how the tax burden is distributed among the properties (Wisconsin 
Department of Revenue, 2020). The combined township and school millage rates for the 
townships in Michigan were extracted from the Ad Valorem Property Tax Report from 
the State of Michigan’s website (State of Michigan, n.d.). The millage rates for 
Wisconsin were extracted from the Town, Village, and City dashboard on the Department 
of Revenue website (https://www.revenue.wi.gov/Pages/RA/TVC-Taxes.aspx). The net 
rate was used as it included the school levy credit. The millage rates were then divided by 
1,000 to represent the amount of tax payable per $1,000 taxable value.  
Additional sources of revenue for the townships include revenue sharing payments 
from the state, and Payment-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILT) from lands owned by the federal and 
state governments. Revenue sharing payments from Michigan were collected from the 
State of Michigan’s Department of Treasury website where the summed total of the 
constitutional, city, village, and township revenue sharing (CVTRS) statutory, and 
supplemental CVTRS statutory were included. The revenue sharing payments from 
Wisconsin were collected from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue website, where the 
sum of the payments from the county and municipal aid, utility aid, and the expenditure 
restraint programs were included. PILT payments from federal lands in Michigan were 
collected from the U.S. Department of Interior website (https://www.doi.gov/), and PILT 
payments from state lands were collected from Michigan’s Department of Natural 
Resources website. Since these payments are reported at the county level a PILT rate was 
calculated by dividing the total payment made to the county by the total acres in each 
county. This rate was then applied to the federal/state acreage in each of the townships 
within that county. PILT payments from federal and state lands in Wisconsin were 
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collected from the state’s Department of Natural Resources (B. Daul 2020, personal 
communication, 6 October), and these reports were given at the township level.  
 
Table 2: Sources of Data Collected for Michigan and Wisconsin townships 
State Type of Data Source 




Michigan Department of Natural Resources – 
Tax Year 2018 Commercial Forest Reports by 
County 
Total Taxable Value 
State of Michigan Department of Treasury – 
State Tax Commission 2018 Taxable Valuation 
Report 
Millage rates 
State of Michigan –  
2018 Ad Valorem Property Tax Report 
Revenue Sharing 
State of Michigan Department of Treasury –  
Constitutional and CVTRS Revenue Sharing 
Projections FY2018 and FY2019 Actuals  
PILT from Federal 
Lands 
U.S. Department of Interior – 
Payments and Acreage by State/County 2018 
PILT from State 
Lands 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources –  





Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources – 
2018 Acreage Summary Report by Municipality 
Total Assessed 
Values 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue –  
Preliminary Major Class Comparison Report 
Millage Rates 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue –  
The Town, Village, and City Dashboard 
Revenue Sharing 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue –  
2019 Estimated Shared Revenue and 
Expenditure Restraint Payments 
PILT from Federal 
Lands 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources –  
FFY2018 USFS PILT 
PILT from State 
Lands 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources –  
Payment of State Aid to Municipalities as 
Provided by Section 70.114 of the Statutes for 
the Payment Year 2019 
 
Payment of 88 cents per acre to Towns for the 






2.2 Spreadsheet Model 
 
A deterministic model was used to simulate the effects of increased acres enrolled 
in the forest tax programs on townships millage rates, assuming that township property 
tax revenues need to remain constant. The calculation used for estimating the total 
property tax revenues received by each township is as follows:  
 
𝑅 = (𝑇𝑇𝑉 ∗ 𝑀𝑅) + (𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑅) + 𝑋 + 𝑃 + 𝑅𝑆 
 
The total revenue (R) was calculated by summing together the taxes paid for non-enrolled 
properties, which is the product of the township’s total taxable value for real property 
(TTV) and that township’s millage rate (MR), the taxes paid for enrolled properties, 
which is the product of the total acres enrolled (A) and the program’s tax rate (PR), the 
state reimbursement payment for properties enrolled in the forest tax programs (X), PILT 
payments made for federal and state lands (P), and revenue sharing payments (RS). For 
Michigan the state reimburses townships at the same rate that is levied on the enrolled 
properties, the $1.30 per acre of enrolled land. For Wisconsin the state reimburses the 
townships at $0.20 per acre of enrolled land.  
Hypothetical scenarios were run to simulate the effect of increases in enrolled 
forestland on townships’ millage rates, again assuming total revenue (R) remained 
constant. Three scenarios of a 5%, 10%, and 15% increase in enrolled acres were run for 
each township, and a new millage rate was calculated based on the changes in enrollment.  
 
𝑀𝑅 = (𝑅 − (𝐴 ∗ (1 + 𝑟) ∗ 𝑃𝑅) − 𝑋 − 𝑃 − 𝑅𝑆)/(𝑇𝑇𝑉 − 𝐴 ∗ (1 + 𝑟) − 𝐴 ∗ 𝑇𝑉) 
 
For each simulated increase in enrollment, total tax revenues from enrolled properties 
was calculated by multiplying the acres enrolled in the forest tax program in 2018 (A) by 
the percent increase (1+r) and then by the program’s tax rate (PR). The total taxable value 
for each township was adjusted to account for the acres of forestland enrolled in the 
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respective forest tax program.  Thus, the adjusted total taxable value for the township was 
calculated by subtracting taxable value of the property that was taken out of the tax base 
and added to the forest tax program, which is the change in enrolled acres multiplied by 
its pre-enrollment taxable value (TV), from the original total taxable value (TTV). For 
Michigan, assumed taxable values for forestland were used across the townships because 
taxable value data for individual properties is not readily available. These assumed 
taxable values for MI were informed by actual taxable values for timber cut-over land, 40 
acres or more, in Houghton County, which were provided by the Houghton County 
Equalization Department. Based on that report, the average taxable value of forested 
properties classified as timber cut-over is $199 per acre, with a range in taxable value 
from $21 to $1,225 per acre (See Appendix A). For Wisconsin, tax parcel data were used 
to derive average taxable values of properties 20 acres or more in classification 6 
(productive forest). The average taxable value of productive forested land for each 
township was then used in the model.  
The simulated changes in tax levy that would be applied to non-enrolled properties 
was calculated by subtracting from the total revenue (R) the new tax levy from enrolled 
properties and the state reimbursement (X), PILT (P), and revenue sharing (RS) 
payments. The new millage rate (MR) could then be calculated by dividing the new tax 
levy paid by non-enrolled properties by the new total taxable value. The new millage rate 
was then subtracted from the 2018 actual millage rate to determine how much it changed, 
and this was then multiplied by 10,000 to determine the township’s change in tax levy per 
$10,000 taxable value. The new millage rate (MR) could then be calculated by dividing 
the new tax levy paid by non-enrolled properties by the new total taxable value. 
 
 
2.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted showing the average changes in tax levies 
across different enrollment scenarios for each State. There were five different taxable 
value scenarios run in Michigan: $50, $250, $500, $750, and $1000 taxable value per 
acre. Each level of taxable value scenario was run with a 5%, 10%, and 15% increase in 
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CF enrollment. Three different scenarios were run in Wisconsin each with a different 
ratio between the proportion of enrolled acres in the open and closed classifications to 
account for the different tax rates associated with each. The increase in MFL enrollment 
in both open and closed lands were simulated at its current ratio, new enrollment only in 
the open category, and new enrollment only in the closed category. Each of these three 
different scenarios were run showing a 5%, 10%, and 15% increase in total MFL 
enrollment within each township. Descriptive statistics showing the mean change in tax 
levy per $10,000 taxable value were calculated for each scenario.  
 
2.4 Correlation Analysis 
 
A correlation analysis was run to see what possible variables are correlated with 
townships’ change in tax levy with an increase in program enrollment. A correlation 
coefficient value of -1 indicates a perfect negative relationship between two variables, 
meaning that as one variable increases the other decreases, a value of 1 indicates a perfect 
positive relationship, meaning that as one variable increases the other increases, and a 
correlation value of 0 indicates no relationship. Two different types of correlation 
coefficients were used to measure the correlation between the townships change in tax 
levy and the other variables: Spearman correlation (ρ), and Kendall’s tau correlation (τ). 
Both correlations are useful for quantitative or ordinal data, and they both indicate how 
strongly two variables are monotonically related (van den Berg, n.d.). Unlike the 
Pearson’s correlation, they do not carry the assumption that the data needs to follow a 
normal distribution, which is why these measures were preferred over Pearson’s 
correlation as the change in tax levy variable is not normally distributed.  
IBM SPSS Statistics Software was used for the correlation analysis. Four different 
scenarios were run for Michigan: change in tax levy with 10% increase in CF enrollment 
at $200, $300, $400, and $500 taxable values per acre. For Wisconsin, the same three 
enrollment ratio scenarios from the sensitivity analysis were run, each showing the 
change in tax levy with a 10% increase in MFL enrollment. The variables examined as 
correlates with the change in tax levy included population density, median household 
income, median house value, the proportion of housing units that were owner-occupied, 
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renter-occupied, and vacant, the proportion of owner-occupied housing units where the 
owner moved in before 2010 and after 2010, the proportion of land area that was either 
enrolled in CF or MFL, the proportion of the township’s total revenue that came from 
enrolled properties/state reimbursement, non-enrolled properties, PILT payments from 
federal and state lands, and revenue sharing payments, and the proportion of total MFL 
land that was open and enrolled from 1987-2004, closed and enrolled from 1987-2004, 
open and enrolled after 2005, and closed and enrolled after 2005 (Table 3). Descriptive 
statistics were also calculated for each of the independent variables.  
Population density and housing data were included in the analysis because of their 
relationship to a township’s available property tax base, and to examine how shifts in tax 
burdens may be impacting rural townships with smaller tax bases, less property value, 
and smaller incomes. The number of properties already enrolled in the forest tax 
programs, and the amount of revenue coming from those properties, would also give an 
indication of the township’s available tax base, as one would expect that a township with 
a greater proportion of land already enrolled would have fewer properties left in the tax 
base to shift the tax burden onto, thereby resulting in the township’s change in tax levy to 
increase with increasing enrollment. The proportion of revenue coming from PILT and 
revenue sharing payments variables were included to examine if those additional 
revenues are in any way helping to reduce the township’s sensitivity to increases in 
program enrollment. The different MFL enrollment categories were included to better 
understand if properties enrolled in a certain category cause a greater effect on the 
township’s change in tax levy. Since lands enrolled before 2005 pay much more reduced 
taxes, as well as open land enrolled after 2005, it is expected that these variables would 
have a positive relationship with the township’s change in tax levy. It is expected for the 
closed lands enrolled after 2005 to have a negative association with the township’s 
change in tax levy. Since a higher tax fee is levied on closed lands, a higher proportion of 
them in a township may reduce the township’s sensitivity to increases in enrollment as a 
reduced tax revenues would be expected from the non-enrolled properties to make up for 
the loss in tax revenue.  
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Table 3: Description of variables used in correlation analysis  
Name Description 
Pop. Den. Population density per square mile 
Med. Inc. Median household income 
Med. H. Val. Median house value 
% Owner % of housing units that are owner-occupied 
% Renter % of housing units that are renter-occupied 
% Vacant % of housing units that are vacant 
% Moved pre 2010 
% of owner-occupied housing units where owner moved in 
before 2010 
% Moved post 2010 
% of owner-occupied housing units where owner moved in 
after 2010 
% CF Tax 
% of total revenue that came from CF enrolled properties and 
state reimbursement 
% Non-CF Tax % of total revenue that came from non-CF enrolled properties 
% MFL Tax 
% of total revenue that came from MFL enrolled properties 
and state reimbursement 
% Non-MFL Tax 
% of total revenue that came from non-MFL enrolled 
properties 
% PILT % of total revenue that came from federal/state PILT 
% RS % of total revenue that came from revenue sharing payments 
% CF Land % of total township area that is enrolled in CF 
% MFL Land % of total township area that is enrolled in MFL 
% Pre 2005 Open % of total MFL that is open and enrolled between 1987-2004 
% Pre 2005 Closed 
% of total MFL that is closed and enrolled between 1987-
2004 
% Post 2005 Open % of total MFL that is open and enrolled after 2005 





3.1 Michigan’s Upper Peninsula – Commercial Forest Program 
 
Currently, approximately 2.2 million acres of private forests are enrolled in the CF 
program in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. Of the 149 townships in the Upper Peninsula, 
129 have at least one parcel of land enrolled in the CF program and 20 of the townships 
do not have any land enrolled. As this analysis is based on a percent increase in current 
CF enrollment, the townships that do not have any land currently enrolled were excluded 
from the analyses as any percent increase would only continue to result in zero land 
enrolled. 
 
3.1.1 Township Data 
The average township has a population density of about 16.6 people per square 
mile, with a range of 0.2 to 189.1 people per square mile (Table 4). The average township 
has a median household annual income of around $49,005, and a median house value of 
around $124,143 (Table 4). On average about 44.6% of housing units within a township 
are owner-occupied while 49% are vacant, and 6.4% are renter-occupied (Table 4). Of 
the owner-occupied units, an average of 72.2% had the owner moving in before 2010, 
and 27.8% of the units were moved in after 2010 (Table 4). Longer-tenured owner 
occupants are an important consideration for Michigan, as the state caps the rate of 
increase on a property’s taxable value so that the annual increases cannot exceed the rate 
of 1.05 or the inflation rate, whichever is lowest. When a transfer of ownership occurs 
then the property is uncapped, and its taxable value is assessed at its current market 
value. In general, longer-tenured occupants pay lower property taxes than those who 
recently purchased a piece a property, due to the rate of taxable value increase being 
capped at the year when the purchase was made.   
Of all the townships that currently have properties enrolled in the CF program, on 
average about 20.6% of the total township land area consists of CF land, with some 
townships having as low as 0.1% of CF land and some having as much as 86.9% of their 
land area enrolled in the program (Table 4). Of the total property tax revenue that is 
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received by the township, an average of 75.8% comes from the non-CF enrolled 
properties, 10.7% from PILT payments from federal and state lands, 8.2% from revenue 
sharing payments from the state, and 4.9% from CF enrolled properties and the state 
reimbursement (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables in study 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Pop. Den. (per sq. mi.) 16.6 26.42 0.2 189.1 129 
Med. Inc. $49,005 $9,704.27 $26,667 $79,250 127 
Med. H. Val. $124,143 $41,355.80 $48,800 $272,200 127 
% Owner 44.6 16.66 4.5 90.6 129 
% Renter 6.4 6.49 0.0 40.8 129 
% Vacant 49.0 19.75 2.3 94.8 129 
% Moved pre-2010 72.2 8.18 41.4 88.9 129 
% Moved post-2010 27.8 8.18 11.1 58.6 129 
% CF Land 20.6 19.06 0.1 86.9 129 
% CF Tax 4.9 5.69 0.01 31.1 129 
% PILT 10.7 11.73 0 59.2 129 
% Non-CF Tax 75.8 12.31 33.7 95.0 129 
% RS 8.2 5.16 1.3 31.1 129 
% Townships with at 
least 1 CF parcel 
86.6         
Note: Only includes the 129 townships that currently have CF land, excludes 20 townships that do not 
currently have land enrolled in CF 
 
 
3.1.2 Simulation Results 
 
The acreage of forested land that is still available in a township to be enrolled in 
the CF program was estimated using GIS, to determine if the percent increase in 
enrollment is even possible. This was determined using land cover data from the National 
Land Cover Database, and shapefiles from the state’s website showing acreages of land 
enrolled in the CF program, as well as federal and state-owned land. Individual parcel 
data was not readily available for Michigan, so the estimate is based on total available 
forested acreage disregarding individual parcel size. There was one township for which a 
5%, 10%, and 15% increase was not possible due to limited acreage of available forest, 
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and another township for which a 15% increase was not possible. These townships were 
excluded from the analyses for the scenarios at which a percent increase was no longer 
possible.  
Overall, tax rates increased for non-CF properties as a result of increased 
enrollment in CF across all combinations of percent increase and assumed taxable value 
of non-enrolled forestland (Fig. 4). The increase in the tax levy is higher when the 
forested property is valued at a higher taxable value and when there is a greater increase 
in program enrollment (Table 5). Higher valued properties pay higher taxes than lower 
valued properties, so it would be a greater loss to the township’s tax revenue if that 
higher property was to be removed from the property tax base and enrolled in a forest tax 
program. Higher increases in program enrollment would also result in higher tax rate 
increases as more properties are being removed from the tax base, causing a greater shift 
in the tax burden for the remaining properties. For forested properties that qualify for 
enrollment (productive forests over 40 acres), with an assumed value $500 per acre, and 
assuming a 10% increase in program enrollment, non-enrolled properties would see their 
tax bills increase by $5.15 per $10,000 taxable value (Table 5), which is a 2.32% 
increase. Assuming a taxable value of $1,000 per forested acre, and a 10% increase in 
program enrollment, the non-enrolled properties experience an average tax levy increase 
of $13.26 per $10,000 taxable value across all townships (Table 5), which is a 5.99% 
increase in the tax rate. In contrast, assuming low taxable values of properties, increasing 
enrollment in CF resulted in a reduction in the taxes levied on non-enrolled property. For 
instance, a 10% increase in enrollment of forested properties with an assumed average 
taxable value of $50 per acre resulted in a reduction of $0.86 per $10,000 taxable value in 
the tax bills (Table 5). Properties that have such a low taxable value would actually pay 
higher taxes if they were to enroll in the CF program. For example, in L’Anse township 
in Baraga County where the current mill rate is 19.55, a 40-acre property valued at $50 
per acre taxable value would be paying $39.10 in property taxes. If that property enrolled 
in the CF program their tax bill would increase to $52, with the program’s tax rate of 
$1.30 per acre. High enrollment increases of these low valued properties in the CF 
program would therefore enable townships to reduce the tax rate for non-enrolled 
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properties, as they would be receiving higher tax revenues. However, such a scenario is 
unlikely to occur as there would be no tax incentive for the landowners to enroll. While 
the average township has a rather minimal change in their millage rate with increasing 
enrollment, some townships experienced much higher changes, resulting in higher tax 
levies on the non-enrolled properties (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for change in tax levy for various CF enrollment scenarios  






Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. N 
50 
5% -$0.43 $0.55 -$2.43 $0.00 128 
10% -$0.86 $1.10 -$4.90 $0.00 128 
15% -$1.24 $1.61 -$7.41 $0.00 126 
250 
5% $0.83 $1.37 $0.00 $8.55 128 
10% $1.69 $2.84 $0.00 $17.89 128 
15% $2.44 $4.26 $0.00 $28.13 126 
500 
5% $2.45 $3.85 $0.00 $22.68 128 
10% $5.15 $8.33 $0.00 $49.96 128 
15% $7.65 $13.09 $0.00 $83.40 126 
750 
5% $4.16 $6.53 $0.00 $38.17 128 
10% $8.97 $14.84 $0.00 $89.27 128 
15% $13.80 $24.91 $0.01 $161.20 126 
1000 
5% $5.95 $9.43 $0.00 $55.24 128 
10% $13.26 $22.71 $0.01 $138.58 128 






Figure 4: The change in tax levy per $10,000 taxable value on non-enrolled properties across 
differing taxable values and increases in CF enrollment. Note: excludes 23 outliers 
 
 
3.1.3 Correlation Results 
 
Correlation coefficients were calculated to identify associations between U.S. 
Census and revenue source data and changes in tax levy as a result of increased CF 
enrollment (Table 6). All coefficients were significant, though the strength of the 
associations varied between the different taxable value scenarios. The Spearman’s rho 
correlation coefficients showed stronger relationships than the Kendall’s tau-b correlation 
coefficients (Table 3). The proportion of the township’s total revenue that comes from the 
payments made by CF taxpayers and the state’s reimbursement for enrollment resulted in 
a strong positive correlation with the township’s change in tax levy (ρ = 0.878; τ = 0.830 
at 500 TV) (Table 6; Fig. 6a). The proportion of a township’s total land area that is 
enrolled in the CF program has a more moderately strong positive correlation with the 
township’s change in tax levy (ρ = 0.734; τ = 0.622 at 500 TV) (Table 6; Fig. 5d). 
Population density (ρ = -0.635; τ = -0.444 at 500 TV) (Fig. 5a), the proportion of housing 
units that are owner-occupied (ρ = -0.490; τ = -0.335 at 500 TV) (Fig. 5b), the proportion 
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of total revenue that comes from non-CF taxpayers ((ρ = -0.466; τ = -0.366 at 500 TV) 
(Fig. 6b), and revenue sharing payments (ρ = -0.551; τ = -0.348 at 500 TV) (Fig. 6c) all 
have moderate negative correlations with changes in tax levy for non-enrolled properties. 
The proportion of vacant housing units has a moderate positive relationship with change 
in tax levy (ρ = 0.510; τ = 0.350 at 500 TV) (Fig. 5c). Median household income, median 
house value, the proportion of housing units that are renter-occupied, and the proportion 
of housing units where the owner moved in after 2010 a weakly negatively correlated 
with change in tax levy (Table 6). The proportion of housing units where the owner 
moved in before 2010, and the proportion of total revenue that came from PILT payments 
are weakly positively correlated with change in tax levy (Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Correlation analysis results for all the independent variables against the 
township’s change in tax levy for differing forested property taxable values 
  Change in Tax Levy at 10% increase 
  200 TV 300 TV 400 TV 500 TV 
  ρ τ ρ τ ρ τ ρ τ 
Pop. Den. -.627** -.442** -.625** -.441** -.623** -.442** -.618** -.437** 
N = 128                 
Med. Inc. -.379** -.257** -.383** -.266** -.384** -.265** -.381** -.262** 
N = 126                 
Med. H. 
Val. 
-.378** -.257** -.370** -.251** -.366** -.248** -.363** -.245** 
N = 126                 
% Owner -.498** -.341** -.488** -.336** -.484** -.331** -.480** -.327** 
N = 128                 
% Renter -.347** -.239** -.345** -.236** -.341** -.233** -.337** -.230** 
N = 128                 
% Vacant .523** .363** .510** .351** .505** .348** .500** .344** 
N = 128                 
% Moved 
pre 2010 
.318** .212** .338** .224** .340** .226** .335** .222** 
N = 128                 
% Moved 
post 2010 
-.318** -.212** -.338** -.224** -.340** -.226** -.335** -.222** 
N = 128                 
% CF .728** .546** .784** .598** .794** .609** .799** .616** 
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N = 128                 
% CF tax .875** .711** .942** .800** .954** .820** .957** .828** 
N = 128                 
% PILT .276** .189** .275** .190** .276** .189** .272** .187** 
N = 128                 
% Non-
CF tax 
-.457** -.302** -.518** -.346** -.531** -.357** -.532** -.359** 
N = 128                 
% RS -.541** -.376** -.505** -.349** -.496** -.342** -.491** -.339** 
N = 128                 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level 




Figure 5: The relationship between (a) population density; (b) the proportion of housing units that 
are owner-occupied; (c) the proportion of housing units that are vacant; and (d) the proportion of 
total land area that is enrolled in the CF program with the township’s change in tax levy with a 
10% increase in CF enrollment with property valued at 200 taxable value, 300 taxable value, 400 








Figure 6: The relationship between the (a) proportion of total tax revenue that comes from 
properties enrolled in CF and the State reimbursement payments; (b) the proportion of total 
revenue that comes from non-CF properties; and (c) the proportion of total tax revenue that 
comes from revenue sharing payments with the township’s change in tax levy with a 10% 
increase in CF enrollment with property valued at 200 taxable value, 300 taxable value, 400 




3.2 Northern Wisconsin – Managed Forest Law 
 
There are currently about 1.2 million acres of forest enrolled in Wisconsin’s MFL 
program. All 149 townships included in this study had at least one parcel enrolled in the 
MFL program. About 19.2% of the total land area in the average township is enrolled in 





enrolled prior to 2005, an average of about 29.6% was enrolled in the open category and 
26.4% in the closed category (Table 7). Of the MFL land that was enrolled after 2005 to 
the present, an average of 14.1% is enrolled in the open category and 29.9% is enrolled in 
the closed category (Table 7). These differences in the enrollment category is an 
important consideration as they pay differing tax rates. Open MFL land enrolled prior to 
2005 makes tax payments at $0.74 per acre, closed MFL land enrolled prior to 2005 pays 
$1.75 per acre, open MFL land enrolled after 2005 pays $2.04 per acre, and closed MFL 
land enrolled after 2005 pays $10.20 per acre in taxes.  
 
3.2.1 Township Data 
 
The average population density in the WI townships included in this study is 13.5 
people per square mile, with a range between 0.7 to 66.5 people per square mile (Table 
8). The average median household income is $51,481 and the median house value is 
$147,303 (Table 8). The average township has a greater proportion of vacant housing 
units (50.6%) with 43.4% of the housing units being owner-occupied, and 6% being 
renter-occupied (Table 8).  
Unlike Michigan, average taxable value was based on tax parcel data, where the 
average taxable value of productive forested property in parcels greater than 20 acres was 
calculated for each township. The average taxable value of all the non-enrolled forested 
property is $1613 per acre, with a range from $428 to $2,839 per acre. Of the total 
property tax revenue generated that came into the various townships in 2018, an average 
of 70.2% came from non-MFL enrolled properties, 10.6% from federal/state PILT 
payments, 10% from revenue sharing payments, and 9.2% from MFL enrolled properties 
and the state reimbursement (Table 8). For some townships the payments from MFL 
properties and the state reimbursement made up as much as 37.6% of the total tax 






Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the different MFL land enrollment categories 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
% MFL Land 19.2 14.43 1.5 83.3 149 
% Pre 2005 Open 29.6 25.80 0.0 98.1 149 
% Pre 2005 Closed 26.4 15.60 1.1 66.7 149 
% Post 2005 Open 14.1 10.93 0.0 51.3 149 
% Post 2005 Closed 29.9 17.62 0.0 80.5 149 
 
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for independent variables in study 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Pop. Den. 13.5 13.86 0.7 66.5 149 
Med. Inc. $51,481 $10,604 $25,694 $94,375 149 
Med. H. Val. $147,303 $37,912 $59,000 $272,100 148 
% Owner 43.4 17.61 10.6 89.1 149 
% Renter 6.0 4.85 0.2 36.8 149 
% Vacant 50.6 19.69 3.1 88.0 149 
% Moved pre 2010 73.4 6.63 55.9 95.8 149 
% Moved post 2010 26.6 6.6 4.2 44.14 149 
TV of Forestland* 1613 356.3 428 2839 149 
% MFL Tax 9.2 5.86 0.6 37.6 149 
% Non-MFL Tax 70.2 15.71 12.7 93.8 149 
% PILT 10.6 15.37 0.0 83.8 149 
% RS 10.0 8.71 0.4 49.2 149 
      * Property classification code: 6 
 
 
3.2.2 Simulation Results 
 
Acreage of available forests that could potentially be enrolled was estimated for 
each township from tax parcel data. Available acreage was based on properties that are 
classified as productive forest (classification 6) and that are 20 acres or more, which is 
the MFL minimum acreage requirement. There are 10 townships for which a 5% 
enrollment increase is not possible, due to limited acreage of available forested 
properties, 20 townships for whom a 10% increase is not possible, and 34 townships for 
whom a 15% increase is not possible. These townships were excluded from the analyses.  
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Within each of the three different enrollment scenarios between open and closed lands, as 
enrollment increases the mean change in tax levy also increases (Table 9 and Fig. 7). The 
scenario that assumes all new enrollment is in the open category had the highest average 
change in tax levy, and the scenario where all the increasing enrollment goes in the 
closed category had the lowest average change in tax levy (Table 9 and Fig. 7). For the 
open scenario, with a 10% increase in enrollment, the mean tax levy increases by $12.21 
per $10,000 taxable value in the average township, which is about an 8.2% increase in the 
tax rate.  
Assuming a 10% increase in new enrollment and assuming the current ratio of 
closed to open enrollment, the average township experiences an increase in mean tax levy 
for non-enrolled property of $10.17 per $10,000 taxable value, which is a 6.8% increase 
in the tax rate. With a 10% increase enrollment in the closed scenario, the average tax 
levy increases by $6.98 per $10,000 taxable value, which is an 4.6% increase in the tax 
rate. There is a wide range across the townships in their tax levy changes with increasing 
enrollment, with some townships experiencing rather minimal changes in their tax levy 
and others much higher changes. In the closed scenario there were even some townships 
that experienced a reduction in the tax levy (Table 9).  
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for the change in tax levy for different MFL enrollment 
scenarios 









Min Max N 
Current 
5% $5.09 $6.06 $0.14 $34.80 139 
10% $10.17 $14.62 $0.28 $97.29 129 
15% $11.71 $13.53 $0.43 $120.38 115 
Open 
5% $6.09 $6.44 $0.22 $36.30 139 
10% $12.21 $15.42 $0.43 $101.48 129 
15% $14.70 $14.67 $0.65 $126.77 115 
Closed 
5% $3.55 $3.68 -$1.24 $21.84 139 
10% $6.98 $8.06 -$2.53 $55.15 129 







Figure 7: The change in tax levy per $10,000 taxable value on non-enrolled properties for          




3.2.3 Correlation Analysis 
 
All the correlation analyses were conducted with a 10% enrollment increase 
within each of the three enrollment ratio scenarios. The proportion of land area enrolled 
in the MFL program has a moderately strong positive correlation when considering ρ 
correlation coefficient (Current - ρ = 0.751; Open - ρ = 0.759; Closed - ρ = 0.713), and a 
more moderate positive correlation when considering τ correlation coefficient (Current - τ 
= 0.571; Open - τ = 0.577; Closed - τ = 0.535) that is significant with a township’s 
change in tax levy across each of the three scenarios (Table 10; Fig. 8a). The proportion 
of total revenue that comes from MFL taxes and the state reimbursement also has a 
significant positive correlation with change in tax levy that is moderately strong when 
looking at ρ correlation coefficient (Current - ρ = 0.695; Open - ρ = 0.0.732; Closed - ρ = 
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0.691) and more moderate when looking at τ correlation coefficient (Current - τ = 0.521; 
Open - τ = 0.556; Closed - τ = 0.516) (Table 10; Fig. 8d).  
The proportion of MFL lands that were enrolled in the open category prior to 
2005 has a moderate positive correlation with change in tax levy in the current ratio (ρ = 
0.590; τ = 0.426) and fully open (ρ = 0.551; τ = 0.395) scenarios, but a moderately-weak 
positive correlation in the fully closed (ρ = 0.426; τ = 0.306) scenario (Table 10; Fig. 8b). 
The proportion of MFL lands enrolled in the closed category after 2005 has a moderate 
negative correlation with change in tax levy in the current ratio (ρ = -0.549; τ = -0.400) 
and fully open (ρ = -0.518; τ = -0.376) scenarios, and a moderately-weak negative 
correlation in the fully closed (ρ = -0.384; τ = -0.281) scenario (Table 10; Fig. 8c). The 
proportion of MFL lands enrolled in the closed category prior to 2005, the proportion of 
total revenue that comes from non-MFL enrolled properties, population density, and the 
proportion of owner-occupied housing units all have significant weak negative 
correlations with a township’s change in tax levy (Table 10). The proportion of vacant 
housing units has a significant weak positive correlation with a township’s change in tax 
levy (Table 10). Median household income, median house value, the proportion of 
housing units that are renter-occupied, the proportion of housing units where the owner 
had moved in either before or after 2010, the average taxable value of forested property, 
the proportion of total revenue that came from either PILT or revenue sharing payments, 
and the proportion of MFL lands that were enrolled in the open category after 2005 all 
are insignificantly correlated with a township’s change in tax levy from increasing 












Table 10: Correlation analysis results for all the independent variables against the 
township’s change in tax levy for the differing MFL enrollment scenarios 
  Change in Tax Levy with 10% enrollment increase 
  Current Ratio Open Closed 
  ρ τ ρ τ ρ τ 
Pop. Den. -.303** -.217** -.308** -.216** -.193* -.135* 
N = 129       
Med. Inc. -0.145 -0.100 -0.154 -0.106 -0.079 -0.051 
N = 129       
Med. H. Val. -0.148 -0.095 -0.160 -0.105 -0.125 -0.088 
N = 128       
% Owner -.238** -.163** -.252** -.171** -.184* -.124* 
N = 129       
% Renter -0.124 -0.085 -0.125 -0.081 -0.099 -0.064 
N = 129       
% Vacant .229** .156** .240** .163** .194* .129* 
N = 129       
% Moved pre 
2010 
0.106 0.068 0.096 0.066 0.036 0.022 
N = 129       
% Moved post 
2010 
-0.106 -0.068 -0.096 -0.066 -0.036 -0.022 
N = 129       
TV -0.116 -0.083 -0.111 -0.078 0.074 0.052 
N = 129       
% MFL Tax .678** .501** .725** .542** .678** .499** 
N = 129       
% Non-MFL Tax -.301** -.216** -.294** -.210** -.242** -.172** 
N = 129       
% PILT 0.139 0.095 0.128 0.088 0.138 0.094 
N = 129       
% RS -0.111 -0.072 -0.134 -0.086 -0.129 -0.086 
N = 129       
% MFL Land .708** .530** .719** .538** .661** .489** 
N = 129       
% Pre 2005 Open .542** .389** .495** .352** .339** .244** 
N = 129       
% Pre 2005 
Closed 
-.314** -.221** -.256** -.176** -0.142 -0.100 
N = 129       
% Post 2005 Open 0.137 0.096 0.103 0.074 0.110 0.077 
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N = 129       
% Post 2005 
Closed 
-.481** -.346** -.444** -.319** -.283** -.208** 
N = 129             
    Note: * Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level 







Figure 8: The relationship between the (a) proportion of total land area that is enrolled in MFL; 
(b) the proportion of open MFL land that was enrolled prior to 2005; (c) the proportion of closed 
MFL land that was enrolled after 2005; and (d) the proportion of total revenue that comes from 
MFL properties and State reimbursement with the township’s change in tax levy with a 10% 
increase in MFL enrollment across three different enrollment scenarios: at the current open/closed 








4.1 Variability of shifting tax burdens 
 
Increasing enrollment in forest tax programs can result in subsequent increases in a 
township’s property tax rate, assuming that the township needs to maintain a constant tax 
revenue, which shifts the tax burden onto non-enrolled properties. This increase occurs 
because the township’s tax base is reduced due to forestland being enrolled in a forest tax 
program and therefore no longer subject to local tax rates. Based on these simulated 
results, the effect of the tax shift is relatively small for most townships in Michigan’s 
Upper Peninsula and northern Wisconsin. However, there is a range in sensitivity 
amongst the townships to changes in program enrollment, with some townships 
experiencing much higher property tax rate increases and others rather minimal changes 
to the tax rate with increasing enrollment. For example, while the average township in the 
Upper Peninsula experienced a 2.3% tax rate increase with a 10% increase in CF 
enrollment assuming forest properties are valued at $500 taxable value (See Appendix 
A), individual townships ranged in tax increases from as low as 0.002% to as high as 
16.8%. The variability was even greater in northern Wisconsin, where the average 
township experienced a 6.8% increase in the tax rate with a 10% increase in MFL 
enrollment at the current ratio of opened to closed enrollment types, but the range in tax 
rate increase fell between 0.002% to 64.7%.  
A wide range in sensitivity to changes in program enrollment has also been seen in 
past studies. Dunford and Marousek (1981) found that tax rate increases ranged from 
1.1% to 21.9% in Spokane County, Washington, due to increases in enrollment in the 
use-value assessment program for farmland. Rickenbach and Saunders (2009) reported 
similar findings in Wisconsin, where some townships experienced only slight changes in 
the tax rate while others experienced much larger changes with changes in MFL 
enrollment.  
The results of this study indicate that the difference in sensitivity seems to be 
connected with the ruralness of a township and the size of its tax base, which includes all 
the non-enrolled properties. This result is similar to findings from past studies (Dunford 
and Marousek, 1981; Brighton, 1993; Rickenbach and Saunders, 2009). According to the 
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correlation analysis, the proportion of enrolled land in a township had the strongest 
positive correlation with the change in tax levy per $10,000 of taxable value, along with 
the proportion of revenue that comes from the enrolled properties, which includes State 
reimbursements (Tables 6 and 10). This result suggest that a higher proportion of enrolled 
forestland reduces the available tax base, thereby shifting the tax burden to make up for 
the lost revenue to fewer properties that have a relatively small combined taxable value. 
For example, a township with 60% of its land area enrolled in a forest tax program would 
mean only 40% of the land includes property that is subject to adjustment in millage rates 
that would be required to make up for reduced tax revenues as a result of increases in 
forest tax program enrollment. Arguably, non-enrolled properties would feel the tax shift 
more heavily in a township with a smaller tax base than would non-enrolled properties in 
a township with a larger tax base, as there are fewer properties available to shift the 
burden onto. 
A smaller population density suggests a more rural township, and also may indicate 
a relatively smaller tax base. Population density was negatively correlated with changes 
in tax rates, although this relationship was much weaker in Wisconsin than in Michigan 
(Tables 6 and 10). This result may suggest that increased enrollment into a forest tax 
programs in low population density townships shift the tax burden onto fewer properties, 
which would mean that they would have to bear a greater share to make up for the loss in 
tax revenue due to the increasing enrollment in the forest tax program.  
A negative association was observed between the proportion of housing units that 
are owner-occupied and the change in tax rate for non-enrolled properties. The more 
sensitive townships in Michigan were those that only had about 20-40% of its housing 
units being owner-occupied, with about 60-80% being vacant (Fig 5b and 5c). A higher 
proportion of owner-occupied units in a township could suggest a larger tax base and 
hence more properties available to shift the burden of the property tax onto, leading to a 
smaller change in tax levy for that township. In Michigan it is also important to note that 
owner-occupied units are subject to a cap on their property taxes. When a property is 
purchased in Michigan, the rate of increase in the property’s taxable value becomes 
capped so that it cannot exceed 1.05 or the inflation rate, whichever is less. The taxes 
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being levied on these units may be even lower than what it would normally be based on 
the current market value of that property, depending on the tenure of ownership. 
Considering this aspect, it is difficult to explain why there is a negative correlation 
between change in tax levy and proportion of owner-occupied units, as the taxable value 
of the property depends on the tenure of the current owner as well as the market value. 
They could be paying much lower taxes if the unit has been occupied by its current owner 
for several years, or the taxes could be relatively higher if the unit has been more recently 
purchased and its property uncapped.  
The proportion of housing units that are classified as vacant has a positive 
correlation in Michigan and Wisconsin, meaning that the greater the percent of vacant 
units, the higher the change in tax levy, according to the simulation. However, this result 
is difficult to interpret because the vacant classification includes both vacation homes that 
are not listed as the primary residence of the owner and units that are abandoned. It 
would be expected that a higher proportion of vacation homes would result in a lower 
change in tax levy as a result of increased forest tax program enrollment assuming such 
homes are higher valued properties. Moreover, the cap applied to the rate of increase of a 
property’s taxable value is not applicable to second homes, only to properties of primary 
residence in Michigan. In contrast, if a township has a high proportion of truly vacant 
units (i.e. abandoned) that would be assumed to have low values, then the townships 
would likely receive little tax revenues from such units. However, since this difference 
cannot be distinguished in the variable it is hard to conclude what is causing this variable 
to have positive relationship with the change in tax levy.  
This capping of the rate of taxable value increase on owner-occupied units in 
Michigan would also explain why the year that the owner moved into the unit would be 
significant, although the correlation for that variable is rather weak (Table 6). The lower 
the proportion of owner-occupied units where the owner moved in before 2010, the lower 
the change in tax levy experienced in the township, and the higher the proportion of 
owner-occupied units where the owner moved in after 2010, the higher the change in tax 
levy. Under Michigan’s capping law, when ownership is transferred the property’s 
taxable value is uncapped and is set at 50% of its true cash value. Thus, more recently 
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purchased properties tend to pay higher property taxes than properties that have not 
changed ownership for many years as the property’s value would have increased to its 
current market value. Wisconsin does not cap the rate of increase of taxable values of 
properties at time of purchase, which no doubt explains why these variables are not 
significantly correlated with the township’s change in tax levy for that state.  
 
4.2 Open vs Closed MFL Properties 
 
There are two categories of enrollment for the MFL program in Wisconsin - 
landowners can opt to have their land either open or closed to the public. This is unlike 
the CF program where all enrolled properties are required to be open to the public for 
recreational purposes, such as hunting, trapping, and fishing. In Wisconsin, MFL 
properties kept open to the public are subject to a lower fixed tax rate of $2.04 per acre, 
whereas closed properties are subject to a $10.20 per acre fixed rate. There is also a 
difference in tax rates depending on when the property was enrolled. If enrolled between 
1987 and 2004, properties are taxed at $0.74 per acre for open land and $1.75 for closed 
land. According to the simulations, the proportion of land enrolled in these MFL 
categories correlated with a township’s sensitivity. Townships with a higher proportion of 
open land that was enrolled before 2005 tend to be the ones most sensitive to changes in 
further enrollment, having higher changes in tax levy. With such a reduced tax rate, pre-
2005 open enrollments resulted in a greater shift in the tax burden, as more tax revenue 
would need to come from the remaining properties in the tax base to offset the reduced 
revenue coming from the enrolled properties. Closed lands enrolled after 2005 had the 
opposite correlation, where a higher proportion of closed properties correlated with a 
lower change in tax levy for the townships. These properties pay a much higher tax rate 
than MFL properties in the other categories, and for some townships this rate is even 
greater than what the non-enrolled properties are being levied. For example, in Sanborn 
township in Ashland County the average tax levy per acre on non-enrolled properties is 
$2.03 per acre. In these instances, closed MFL properties are paying even more in taxes 
than the non-enrolled properties, which would make sense why higher enrollment would 
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end up aiding the townships making them less sensitive to further changes in enrollment. 
Sanborn township was even seen to experience a reduction in its tax rate with increasing 
enrollment in the closed category (Table 9). Interestingly the proportion of open MFL 
land enrolled after 2005 does not have any correlation with a township’s change in tax 
levy (Table 10). With the reduced rates on open land in general, the scenario where 100% 
of the increasing enrollment occurred in the open category was seen to have the highest 
changes in tax levy for the average township (Fig. 7). Though based on the correlations, 
the proportion of open land enrolled before 2005 has a greater influence on a township’s 
sensitivity to further increases in enrollment than the open land enrolled after 2005.  This 
is most likely due to the much lower rates that are levied on pre-2005 open properties. It 
makes sense that the shifting of the tax burden in a township would be more influenced 
by its proportion of open lands that were enrolled before 2005 than of any other category, 
as more revenue is lost from those enrolled properties. For some townships as well the 
tax rate levied on open lands enrolled after 2005 is not much different from the current 
average tax levy per acre on non-enrolled properties, such as is the case for Sanborn 
township. This could also explain why the proportion of those enrolled properties does 
not have a significant relationship with a township’s sensitivity.  
For Michigan different scenarios were simulated with different assumed taxable 
values of forested property before being enrolled into the program. The correlations were 
the same across differing taxable values, showing that the relationship between increasing 
enrollment and change in tax levy is the same no matter what the taxable value is. The 
sensitivity analysis, however, shows higher average changes in tax levy with higher 
valued properties than with lower valued properties. This is logical, as the townships 
would experience a greater loss in tax revenue if the properties that were removed from 
the tax base were more valuable. Lower valued properties would not impose as great a 
loss, and the property tax rate would not need to increase as much. In the Wisconsin 
analyses the actual average taxable value of forested properties was known for each 
township, so the values could be added to the correlation as another variable. However, 
for Wisconsin, the taxable value of a forested property was not seen to have a significant 
correlation with the townships change in tax levy.  
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4.3 PILT and Revenue Sharing 
 
Federal and state lands as well are exempt from property taxes, but to make up for 
this loss in property taxes, they make a payment-in-lieu of taxes to the municipalities. 
Both the States of Michigan and Wisconsin also contribute revenue sharing payments to 
the municipalities to help the local governments offset any losses they may be 
experiencing. Both of these types of payments were accounted for in this study. In the 
Upper Peninsula, both the PILT and revenue sharing payments are significantly 
correlated with a townships change in tax levy, though the revenue sharing payments 
have a stronger relationship than the PILT payments (Table 6). The more help that a 
township receives through the revenue sharing payments, the less sensitive they are to 
changes in CF enrollment (Fig. 6c). The most sensitive townships had less than 10% of 
their revenue coming from revenue sharing payments. In Michigan, the constitutional 
revenue sharing program distributes revenue to the municipalities according to 
population, so it makes sense that the most sensitive townships, which have a lower 
population, would receive smaller payments. With less additional revenue, these rural, 
low population townships with high amounts of CF land may be even more likely to 
increase taxes on non-enrolled properties to make up for the loss in tax revenue from 
increasing enrollment. PILT payments from the federal and state lands had a positive 
relationship with the township’s change in tax levy, though a relatively weak one. The 
higher the proportion of total revenue that came from PILT, the higher the township’s 
change in tax levy. This is probably because a higher PILT payment would mean a higher 
acreage of land that is federal or state owned, and therefore would mean a lower available 
tax base in that township, making it more sensitive to changes in CF enrollment. As the 
PILT payments are positively correlated, it would seem that they do not provide 
significant aid to the townships. This may mean that the payments being currently paid 
are not high enough to offset the township’s loss in property tax revenues. The PILT and 
revenue sharing payments are not significantly correlated with a townships change in tax 
levy in northern Wisconsin. It seems then that such payments neither aid nor cause harm 
to the townships, as there is no real correlation between how much additional revenue a 
township receives with the its sensitivity to changes in enrollment. Rickenbach and 
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Saunders (2009) in their study found that the more sensitive townships in Wisconsin to 
changes in MFL enrollment were indeed receiving a lower amount in revenue sharing 
payments, and they noted that the revenue sharing payments in Wisconsin were frozen at 
the 2003 levels and were no longer being adjusted for any future changes in the land use 
classifications. As our findings do not demonstrate a significant correlation between 
revenue sharing payments and the townships sensitivity to changes in enrollment, it may 
suggest that the payments are indeed not sufficient enough to offset any losses in tax 
revenue experienced by the townships. If the payments were providing sufficient aid to 
the townships it would be expected then to see the less sensitive townships receiving 
higher revenue sharing payments.  
 
4.4 Realistic changes in enrollment 
 
This study implemented hypothetical increases in forest tax program enrollment, 
running scenarios with a 5%, 10%, and 15% increase in enrollment. While the results 
presented here reflect the changes in tax levy with such levels of increase, in reality the 
effect may be much smaller as such increases are rarely seen on a year-to-year basis. In 
Michigan, enrollment in the CF program has changed slightly over the last few years. The 
large boom in enrollment was around 1980, and since then new enrollment acreage has 
steadily decreased (Fig. 9). While the number of applications has slightly increased over 
recent years (Fig. 10), the actual acreage enrolled has been rather minimal, though it can 
be seen that new acres are enrolled into the program every year (Fig. 9). According to the 
National Woodland Owner Survey (NWOS), enrollment of family forests in property tax 
programs in Michigan has increased slightly over the last few years. In 2013 fewer than 
1% of family forests were enrolled in such programs, accounting for 4.8% of the acreage 
(Butler et al. 2016a). In 2018 family owner participation has increased to 3%, accounting 
for 11% of the acreage (Butler et al. 2020). According to Michigan’s Department of 
Natural Resources, though, the change in enrollment on a yearly basis is minimal as the 
new acreage enrolled nearly equals the acreage that is withdrawn from the program (K. 
Maidlow 2020, personal communication, 9 December). For Wisconsin, family forest 
owner participation in property tax programs has slightly decreased by ownership, but the 
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actual acreage of forests enrolled has increased. According to NWOS, in 2013 about 
21.8% of family forest owners were enrolled in a property tax program, accounting for 
36.6% of the acreage (Butler et al. 2016b). In 2018 the acreage enrolled increased to 
39%, but family ownerships decreased slightly to 21% (Butler et al. 2020). Looking at 
total MFL acreage, including both family forest owners and private corporations, the 
actual change in acreage has only slightly increased by around 1% every year (Table 11) 
(Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 2019). When properties are withdrawn from the 
program they are required to pay a withdrawal fee which goes to the municipalities, to 
make up for the property taxes that have not been being paid on the property. This study 
did not consider decreasing enrollment and did not include withdrawal penalties as a 
source of revenue for the townships, as the amount paid depends on several factors 
including how long the property was enrolled in the program and the property’s acreage. 
However, this additional source of revenue would help to mitigate any losses in tax 
revenue from the properties that are enrolled in the townships, and may help to reduce the 
shift in the tax burden.  
While the average township may be only minimally affected by increasing 
enrollment, it is clear that this affect is not uniform across all the townships and some are 
much more sensitive. In the Upper Peninsula, Baraga and Keweenaw Counties in 
particular are both noted for their large percentages of land being held in the CF and other 
conservation programs, and in Baraga County local citizens have expressed their 
concerns over the county’s declining tax base, due to the large enrollment of land in the 
CF program, and the townships’ ability to generate revenue (Drue, 2021). The results of 
this study show that these concerns are legitimate, as enrollment in forest tax programs 
can cause property tax rates to increase on non-enrolled properties, particularly more so 
in rural townships with a smaller available tax base, such as those in Baraga and 






4.5 Study limitations 
 
4.5.1 Other preferential tax programs 
 
This study focused only on two forest tax programs, CF in Michigan and MFL in 
Wisconsin, but there are other preferential tax programs that offer reduced property taxes, 
such as the Qualified Forest Program in Michigan, as well as conservation trusts where 
the enrolled properties are completely exempt from paying taxes. These other programs 
were not taken into consideration in this study, but may have an effect on a township’s 
property tax rate as enrollment would further reduce the tax base and cause shifts in the 
tax burden. Rickenbach and Saunders (2009) found that the more sensitive townships in 
Wisconsin to changes in MFL enrollment also were townships that had more land 
enrolled in the Agricultural Forest classification, a program that also reduces property 
taxes for qualifying properties. Michigan also has a Qualified Agricultural classification 
where qualifying agricultural properties can be exempt from certain local school 
operating taxes up to 18 mills. However, future research is needed to determine how 
these other tax reduction programs may be affecting the local municipalities and to study 
if there is more or less of a tax reduction compared to the CF and MFL forest tax 
programs.  
 
4.5.2 Benefits of forest tax programs 
 
This study did not take into account the benefits of forest tax programs. Forests 
provide multiple ecosystem services, including timber, protection of wildlife habitat, and 
recreational opportunities, especially for the CF and open MFL properties which are open 
to the public for hunting and other recreational activities. These programs also require the 
enrolled properties to conduct timber harvests, which makes forestry related industries an 
important contributor to the local economy, Wisconsin in particular being ranked second 
out of the top ten states nationwide where a large percentage of its GDP is attributed to 
forestry related industries, contributing about 5% (Pelkki and Sherman, 2019). Forestry is 
an important contributor to the economy in the Upper Peninsula. For example, in the 
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Western region of the Upper Peninsula, the forestry industry accounts for 14% of labor 
income, 13% of employment, and 16% of output, while the Eastern region contributes 
3% of labor income, employment, and output (Leefers, 2016). The forest products 
industry is the leading manufacturer employer in the Eastern Region, and in the Western 
region accounts for over one third of manufacturing jobs (Leefers, 2016).  
Forests can also indirectly affect the local economy in ways other than through 
the forest products industries. For instance, private forests open for public recreation 
promote tourism, which contributes to local businesses. Conservation of large tracts of 
forested land increases the aesthetic appeal of an area, furthering the appeal for both the 
tourists and the local citizens. In Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and Northern Wisconsin 
regions, forests enrolled in the USDA Forest Legacy Program, which is a federal 
conservation program, were found to contribute about $6.9 million in total output in the 
recreation industry, as well as about $138 million in output in the timber industry, 
including both direct and secondary effects (Murray et al., 2018). While forest tax 
programs can reduce a township’s tax base and cause property tax rates to increase on 
non-enrolled properties, these programs also help to conserve forests and to prevent them 
from converting to non-forest use and development. The benefits received from forests 
could help to mitigate any negative effects felt by the townships, particularly in the more 
sensitive and rural townships. Future research is needed to consider the economic 
contributions of forest tax programs, particularly in rural municipalities, to determine if 
the benefits outweigh the costs of enrollment in these forest tax programs.  
 
4.5.3 Short-term vs long-term trends 
 
It is also important to note that this study is based upon only one year of tax data, 
and does not show the effects that enrollment has on the property tax rates over a long 
period of time. In a study by King and Anderson (2004) on the effects of conservation 
easements, they found that in the short-term program enrollment did cause an increase in 
property tax rates for non-enrolled properties, but in the long-term, municipalities were 
able to reduce property tax rates due to an increase in the values of properties 
surrounding the protected areas. Tax bills were still higher on these surrounding 
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properties, due to their higher value, but the tax rate being levied on the properties was 
lower. This study shows that enrollment in the MFL and CF programs can cause property 
tax rates to increase, but the long-term effects have not been well studied. For Wisconsin 
at least, it may be that on the long-term the effects have lessened, due to an increase in 
value of properties surrounding the MFL forests. In Michigan this may not matter as 






Figure 9:  Acreage enrolled in Commercial Forest program from 1926-2020 (K. Maidlow 2021, 















Figure 10: Number of applications per year for the Commercial Forest program 1926-2020 (K. 









1990 372,102 NA 
1995 804,269 116.14% 
2000 1,971,474 145.13% 
2005 2,784,889 41.26% 
2010 3,079,985 10.60% 
2011 3,133,534 1.74% 
2012 3,195,894 1.99% 
2013 3,236,030 1.26% 
2014 3,271,936 1.11% 
2015 3,305,206 1.02% 
2016 3,316,955 0.36% 
2017 3,344,858 0.84% 
2018 3,378,413 1.00% 


















The purpose of this study was to assess the implications of increasing enrollment in 
the Commercial Forest and Managed Forest Law forest tax programs on non-enrolled 
property tax rates in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and northern Wisconsin. Based on the 
hypothetical scenarios in which program enrollment increased 5%, 10%, and 15%, the 
enrollment increases required townships to increase property tax rates to maintain 
revenues, thereby shifting the tax burden onto the non-enrolled properties. In general, the 
magnitude of this increase appears to be rather minimal for the average township, 
especially considering that actual increases in enrollment are likely much lower than the 
simulated increases that were used for this analysis. Overall, rural, less populated 
townships with a small available property tax base appear to be most sensitive to changes 
in program enrollment, experiencing higher tax rate increases. Additional revenue from 
the state and federal governments through revenue sharing and PILT payments do not 
seem to be adequately aiding the townships in helping to mitigate shifts in the tax burden. 
In Michigan, the more sensitive townships were seen to receive the lowest amount of 
revenue from the revenue sharing program, demonstrating that these payments from the 
state are not distributed according to the specific needs of the township. In view of these 
results, the forest tax programs and the states may need to consider making policy 
changes to better address variability in the effects on townships and to help lessen the 
burden of the tax shift on the non-enrolled properties.  
 
5.1 Policy considerations 
 
 States reimburse the townships at differing levels, with regards to the sensitivity 
of each township 
 
It is evident that state aid to the townships through its reimbursement payments for 
enrolled properties and its revenue sharing programs may not be sufficiently aiding the 
townships that are most sensitive to changes in program enrollment. To acknowledge this 
disparity, the reimbursement payments for the forest tax programs from the state could be 
altered such that townships are reimbursed according to their specific needs. Currently 
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both states reimburse at a flat rate across all townships, but a possible change could be 
considered such that the reimbursement rate is more dependent on the population and size 
of the township’s tax base. More sensitive townships with low population and a smaller 
tax base could be reimbursed at higher rates than less sensitive townships with a larger 
tax base. With this policy change the tax rate levied on enrolled properties may be able to 
stay the same, as adjusting the reimbursement payments may be sufficient to lessen 
township sensitivity. State reimbursement rates may also need to change on an annual 
basis to reflect any changes in enrollment that occur. Similar policy changes should 
possibly be considered for the states revenue sharing programs as well, so that more 
revenue is being distributed to the townships with lower populations. However, it is 
unlikely that this policy will change for Michigan as its part of the state constitution, 
which places more importance on the reimbursement payments from the state.  
 
 CF and MFL programs increase the tax rate on enrolled properties 
 
It may be necessary for the CF and MFL program administration to consider increasing 
the tax rates in general that are levied on enrolled properties. Reduced taxes are a main 
incentive for these types of programs, but it may be that the current tax rates are set too 
low. Higher tax rates that are still lower than what the normal taxpayer is levied may help 
to lessen the burden of the tax shift. In fact, a recent news report indicated that 
Michigan’s 38th District State Senator, Ed McBroom, is working to try and raise the CF 
program’s tax rate on the enrolled properties and to have conservancies pay higher taxes 
on the properties that are locked in preservation (Drue, 2021). For the MFL program in 
particular, it may be beneficial to consider increasing the tax rates levied on enrolled 
properties, especially the open MFL properties that were enrolled prior to 2005, as it was 
this enrollment category that most influenced Wisconsin township sensitivity. However, 
since properties that enroll in the MFL program sign up with either a 25- or 50-year 
contract, it may not be possible for the program to change its policy and increase the tax 
rates levied on those properties.  
 
 Incorporate a variable tax rate on enrolled properties  
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Another consideration is for the tax rate levied on enrolled properties to be based on the 
average property’s taxable value for that particular township, or on the actual property’s 
taxable value rather than having a flat rate tax applied across the state. This would be 
more tailored to the individual township, better accounting for the differences in 
sensitivity across the townships. However, this would add complexity to the programs, 
and may be a deterrent to landowners enrolling in the program. These programs provide 
many benefits, such as its preservation of forested land, and as much as they can cause a 
negative implication to the property tax revenues in a township, it is also desired for 
enrollment to increase.  
 
 Incorporate different tax rates for corporate/industrial landowners and family 
forest owners 
 
Another consideration for the forest tax programs is to incorporate different tax rates for 
different types of landowners, possibly having higher tax rates on corporate/industrial 
lands than for family forest landowners. Only about 902 acres of family forests in 
Michigan and 3,543 acres of family forests in Wisconsin are currently enrolled in a 
property tax program (Butler et al. 2020). Considering how about 2.2 million acres are 
currently enrolled in the Commercial Forest program (Michigan Department of Natural 
Resources, 2020), and 3.4 million acres are enrolled in the Managed Forest Law program 
(Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2020c), it can be assumed that most 
private forestland enrolled in these programs are owned by industrial or corporate 
landowners. It may help to lessen the township sensitivity if these lands were taxed at a 
higher rate. By only increasing the tax rate on industrial/corporate properties it would 
allow it to stay at its current reduced rate for enrolled properties owned by family forest 
owners, and would continue to act as an incentive to encourage family forest owners to 
enroll in the programs.  
 
 Including a closed option for properties enrolled in CF program  
 
It is also worth considering whether the CF program should offer an option for the 
landowners to keep their land closed to the public, at the expense of a higher tax rate than 
if they were to keep it open to the public. For the MFL program, a higher proportion of 
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closed properties helped to lessen the townships’ sensitivity, due to the higher amount of 
taxes that were being paid from those properties. The most sensitive townships were the 
ones with a higher proportion of properties that were kept open to the public, particularly 
if they were enrolled before 2005 and paying the more reduced tax rate. Offering a closed 
option for the CF program may similarly help to lessen township sensitivity in the Upper 
Peninsula and help to mitigate the shift in the tax burden felt by the non-enrolled 
properties. However, offering such an option may also lead to an increase in program 
enrollment, particularly by family forest owners who may want to keep their properties 
closed to public recreational access. While it may be desired to promote further 
enrollment, a sudden increase in enrollment may also have more negative implications 
than positive, resulting in a greater shift in the tax burden despite the positive effects from 
the higher tax fees on closed lands. While theoretically there is a closed option for 
landowners to be found in the Qualified Forest Program, future research is needed to 
determine the difference in tax rates between this program and the Commercial Forest 
program, and to determine whether offering a closed option for the Commercial Forest 
program is worth considering.  
 
In conclusion, forest tax programs at simulated levels of increased enrollment can have 
negative effects on rural township property tax rates, and these effects differ among 
townships. Rural townships that have a high percentage of land enrolled in forest tax 
programs are most sensitive to increased enrollment, resulting in greater increases in tax 
rates for non-enrolled property. However, the shifting tax burden associated with forest 
tax programs is only one side to the issue. This study only focused on the costs of these 
programs to local municipalities. It is important to also consider the benefits of these 
programs, through active forest management, preservation of large tracts of forested land, 
and public access. Future research is needed to study the economic benefits that these 
programs provide, to whom the benefits accrue, and to study if the benefits outweigh the 
costs of these programs.  
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A Houghton County Timber Cutover Assessment  
 
The assumed taxable values of forested property that were used for the 
hypothetical scenarios for Michigan were derived from actual taxable values of forested 
properties 40 acres or greater and classified as timber cutover land in Houghton County. 
The average taxable value was $199 per acre, with a range between $21 and $1,225 
taxable value per acre (Table A1).  
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Timber Cutover Land 40+ acres in Houghton County 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Taxable Value 
($ per acre)  
199 176.71 21 1,225 536 
Acres 75 50.11 40 480 536 
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